This paper revisits the idea of Muslim Marxism, as espoused through the life and work of the Tatar Muslim and Bolshevik intellectual and revolutionary MirSaid Sultan-Galiev (1892-1940. I argue that Sultan-Galiev's oeuvre-a unique synthesis of Marxist, Muslim modernist, anti-colonial and Third World praxisrepresents a path-breaking take on Muslim selfhood and practices of belonging.
another, that is, between the unmaking of czarist Russia and the making of the Soviet Union, Sultan-Galiev's story is that of a personal and ideological struggle in an inauspicious time; a story of an avant-garde take on Muslim subjectivity, tradition and revolutionary potential, albeit with a tragic ending.
Sultan-Galiev's good repute amongst the Muslims and communists alike of the revolutionary and post-revolutionary Russia of the early twentieth century, earned in an unusually rapid fashion, made him a chief authority on the so-called 'Eastern Question', which in the Soviet context mainly related to its vast eastern territories, populated, amongst others, by millions of Muslims, largely of Turkic origins. It is this anxiety of the emerging Soviet state about its Eurasian Muslim populace-famously exemplified in Lenin's observation that one has to be a thousand times more careful and accommodating than usual when dealing with these 'national minorities' 5 -that provided Sultan-Galiev and other like-minded Muslim activists with an opportunity to negotiate a rather unique, even if short-lived, position for Soviet Muslims, of not only relative freedom to worship and association in an age of militant atheism but also of increasing participation in the state's political and military affairs. Sultan-Galiev's ambitions were, however, much greater, and had he managed to retain the trust of The intent of this article is to provide a preliminary critical reassessment of the rise and fall of Muslim Marxism of Sultan-Galiev's type. Sultan-Galiev's own works, spanning a variety of genres from poetry and prose in Muslim social and educational magazines to relentlessly Bolshevik political writing in state-sanctioned journals such as Zhizn' natsional'nostei (The Life of Nationalities), offer a rich source of analysis in their own right, and are particularly useful when compared with archival data on his party work, trials and prison notes, including an autobiographical letter. 6 Most of these sources are still available in Russian and Tatar only. This is, however, not to say that some of Sultan-Galiev's works have not been of interest to a much wider scholarly and activist community; 7 my argument is, rather, that specifically Muslim dimensions of his social and political mission were more often than not sidelined in contemporary accounts of his life and work, or were given unduly literalist explanations. 8 I would like to propose that such readings of Sultan-Galiev's thought and actions fail to take into account his extraordinarily difficult political position, as a chief mediator between, on the one hand, an increasingly autocratic Soviet socialist elite, bearing all hallmarks of Said's Orientalism and Great-Russian chauvinism, and the reform-minded Muslim Eurasians, on the other. This is particularly true with regards to his interpretation of Muslim subjectivity, which uses but ultimately transgresses the early twentieth-century concepts of ethnic, national and religious belonging in order to re-imagine and give primacy to Muslim political-and, indeed, revolutionary-umma (community). It is equally evident in his formative years, which involved Muslim religious schooling of the so-called jadīdist type, thus inextricably linking his educational experience with the work of an earlier Muslim reformer, Ismail Gasprinski in Turkish İsmail Gasp ral , 85 -1914), a Crimean Tatar deeply invested in a Muslim modernist educational, linguistic and cultural project that had transformed beyond recognition the educational landscape of the late tsarist Russia. 9 I argue that the uṣūl aljadīd, or 'new method', that Gasprinski had introduced to Muslim schools and popularised, as a form of critical thinking, amongst Muslim intelligentsia in the turbulent fin-de-siècle period immediately preceding the fall of the Russian Empire, had
given Mir-Said Sultan-Galiev an invaluable model for his future work. key element of this model, befitting the trying times and circumstances of both Gasprinski 's and Sultan-Galiev's lifeworlds, is that of satr, or 'concealment' for the greater good, which the two reformers have exercised and perfected in their own idiosyncratic ways, thus escaping censorship and other, ostensibly more serious, forms of repression. In Gasprinski 's case, it enabled the gradual introduction of over 5,000 uṣūl al-jadīd schools in Russia by 1916 and the creation of an important intellectual movement that in many ways had assisted the survival of Muslim social and political life in the times to come. In Sultan-Galiev's case, it evolved into a full-fledged revolutionary methodology of rare sophistication; so rare, in fact, that it continues to befuddle the connoisseurs of his work until this very day. I will propose here, albeit with some caution, that the strategic deployment of satr by Gasprinski and Sultan-Galiev, which only a careful deduction can reveal, as it is never explicitly stated, is reminiscent of the satr that used to be a staple of Ottoman social relations, as averred, for example, around the year 1601, by the Ottoman jurist 'Ālī al-Qārī' al-Harawī. 10 In a sense, then, Gasprinski 's and Sultan-Galiev's uses of concealment for the 'greater good' represent a revival of an important principle from a milieu not entirely strange to either of the two reformers.
What follows, then, is an attempt to re-contextualise Sultan-Galiev's oeuvre with a particular focus on its Muslim-specific elements. I will first introduce his take on Muslim subjectivity and praxis, which I understand to be an amalgamation of his 
Sultan-Galiev's early life and directions
Mir-Said Sultan-Galiev was born in 1892 in the Bashkir village of Elembet'evo in the Ufa governorate, which was then part of the Russian Empire. His father, a respected schoolteacher, followed Gasprinski 's 'new method' 11 in teaching his Muslim pupils, including the young Mir-Said. part from what was called 'Islamic history and methods of thought', the curriculum included a variety of social and natural sciences as well as languages other than Russian, such as Tatar and Arabic. 12 Mir-Said's particular passion was Russian literature, which he was able to read in its original language from an early age, as well as Muslim folk stories and customs. The jadīdist schooling taught him critical thinking, however, and some of his earliest contributions to the Muslim press were directed against customary practices that he thought repugnant to modern Muslim culture, such as the ḥudūd punishments for the offence of zina. 13 His further education, directed towards his becoming a teacher himself, as well as his literary and journalist work, quickly gained support from Tatar jadīdist intelligentsia. Yet, his own class experience gave him an opportunity to reflect upon an element that was still clearly missing from Muslim Tatar life-that of social equality and economic justice.
Sultan-Galiev was born into a 'mixed' family of a father who proudly called himself a Mishar Mişär), a member of a Tatar peasant community, 14 and a mother who came from a Tatar noble family. In an autobiographical letter, Sultan-Galiev reflected upon the continuous bullying he was subjected to by his mother's cousins at her father's estate as formative of his early class-consciousness. 'Thus', he wrote in 9 3, 'the farmstead of my grandfather was for me the first and most realistic revolutionary school, cultivating in me a feeling of class hatred'. 15 It is, one can assume, this feeling of his-and the lack thereof in his Tatar intellectual circles-that pushed Sultan-Galiev to Marxist literature, which he read very sparsely. Surprisingly, perhaps, this literature did not impress him very much. What he was after was a social and political movement able to tackle class difference in everyday life and, in his jadīdist mind, one that could simultaneously respond to colonial injustices felt by Muslims everywhere. In his own words, written in 1917, Sultan-Galiev attested that he had discovered such a movement in the form of the olsheviks, because 'they had done more for the Muslims than anyone else'
Only they are striving to transfer the nationalities' fates into their own hands.
Only they revealed who started the world war. What doesn't lead me to them?
They also declared war on English imperialism, which oppresses India, Egypt, Afghanistan, Persia and Arabia. They are also the ones who raised arms against Muslims of Russia and the East, they announced that Istanbul must be in Muslims' hands. 16 This confession reveals some of the elementary tenets of Sultan-Galiev's revolutionary project. His first concern, even when it was not explicitly stated, seemed always to be for Muslims, whose subjectivity he loosely construed as one marked by continuous class and colonial oppression. They were, for him, the most perfect example of Third World proletariat, whose history and social cohesion had made them uniquely placed to ignite and lead world revolution. lthough he frequently used concepts such as 'nationality' and showed special interest in the liberation of Turkic nations from tsarist colonialism and then from post-revolutionary Russian hegemony, in all likelihood he saw panTurkism, of which he was often accused, as but one of the potential avenues towards global Muslim socialist uprising.
Race, class and the Colonial International
Another struggle, directly associated with Sultan-Galiev's project of world revolution, which was often hinted at but, yet again, somewhat obliquely formulated in his writing, was the struggle for racial equality. He wrote of colonialists 'domestic' and 'foreign', as it were, as white racists, who exploited non-white populations of the East, in which he occasionally included the native populations of the Americas, simply on the basis of perceived racial difference. 17 It is plain that he had excluded Turkic and Caucasian Muslims from his definition of 'colonial whiteness'. In his vision of the Colonial International, which was to cooperate with or even replace the Third International , 18 racial and class difference were to be concomitantly tackled. In an almost prophetic gesture, 19 Sultan-Galiev denounced Eurocentric models of class struggle as a contradictio in terminis when applied in the East:
[Hamzić, 'Mir-Said Sultan-Galiev and the Idea of Muslim Marxism'; Page 6 /17] We think that the plan to replace one class of European society by the world dictatorship of its adversary-that is, by another class from this same societywill bring no significant change in the situation of the oppressed part of humanity. Even if there would be a change, it would be for the worse, not for the better. 20 Class differences in the East were, for Sultan-Galiev, inextricably linked to European colonialism and the urban-rural divide it had exacerbated, 'the parasitism and reactionary foundations of the material culture of the metropolis [being] a chief factor of today's global [capitalist] development'. 21 In this context, anti-colonial, racial and class struggle could not be artificially separated from one another.
It is interesting that further social revolution, which for the majority of his Bolshevik comrades undoubtedly meant the demise of all religions, including Islam, was not for Sultan-Galiev something worth pursuing prior to world revolution. 22 On closer inspection, one realises that for him this may not have been something worth pursuing at all. 23 Yet, as the highest-ranking Muslim of the Soviet communist state, 24 which advocated fervent 'atheisation' of its citizens, Sultan-Galiev could not but accept, if only in principle, this tenet of Bolshevik modernity.
But to understand the very possibility of merging Bolshevik and Muslim modernities in a single revolutionary praxis, one needs to take a step back and consider the larger context in which such interventions were taking place.
On jadīds 'on the left' and Bolsheviks turning 'eastwards'
The strand of jadīdism into which Mir-Said Sultan-Galiev was quite literally) born was distinct from that of Gasprinski 's in the Crimea and still different from the jadīd thought in Central Asia. As one of the foremost scholars of this intellectual tradition has averred, jadīdism 'was a coherent movement to the extent that it was or came to be) embedded in a set of self-reproducing institutions (e.g. new-method schools that recruited their own graduates to teach in them). Beyond that, it is difficult to impute any unity to the "movement"'. 25 Even the way the jadīds commonly called themselves-ziyālilar (intellectuals) and taraqqiparwarlar (progressives) 26 -attests to a pluralist community of reformers loosely united but) by a set of common principles. These included their dedication to new methods of production and transmission of knowledge, especially by means of print, translation and pedagogy. Gasprinski 's attempts to achieve greater unity amongst the jadīds through a common literary language did not go down well Islam as a faith and Muslims as a community disappears completely'. 27 Moreover, such Muslim pluralist 'communalism' was not uncommon in many other Third World contexts and was often considered a hallmark of Muslim modernity. 28 While jadīdism was coterminous with the rising awareness amongst Muslims of an increasing political and social importance of the concepts such as 'nation' millat, millet) or 'homeland' watan, vatan), 29 many jadīds, along with some other Muslim intellectuals, refused to take such concepts for granted. Instead, they sought to measure them against the perceived borderlines of their imagined community religious, 'ethnic', linguistic or otherwise) and point to such concepts' numerous shortcomings. Conflating the old Ottoman concept of millet 30 with the term 'nation' was seen as particularly dangerous, since it could have undermined the greater unity (in diversity) and communality of Muslims. 31 Besides, jadīdism rose and was in many ways a response to the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century disintegration of Muslim imperial subjecthood in both Russian and Ottoman empires. The new nation-based concepts of Empire explored both in the early Soviet and Turkish states were met with a mixed response, with some Muslim intelligentsia lamenting the loss of the caliphate 32 while others saw an opportunity for a reformulation of Muslim identity tout court. The precursors of such debates, including Ismail Gasprinski , while toying with the ideas such as pan-Turkism, always kept in mind the 'big picture', i.e. the Muslim umma as a whole, which needed to be revived from its perceived rigor mortis. 33 Many members of the later generations of jadīds, especially some notable contemporaries of Sultan-Galiev, saw the Russian Revolution of 1917 34 as an opportunity to do just that, and 'joined it as soon as it was possible'. 35 No doubt the idea of a Muslim socialist revolution, which the jadīds sought to ignite, differed to that of the Bolsheviks. But, importantly, the two factions shared a vested interest in 'revolutionising the East'. For the olsheviks, the Third World was increasingly becoming a substitute for their (failed) efforts to revolutionise Europe, while the jadids increasingly saw the Russian Revolution as an opportunity to 'help liberate Muslims of India and the Middle East from the tyranny of the ritish' 36 and the French. It is in this context that the ideas about anti-colonialism and communism, which the jadids sought to link with their Muslim and Turkic 'communalism', began to converge, thus preparing a ground for further cross-fertilisation.
At first, the jadids and other Muslim intellectuals 'on the left' sought to preserve the plurality of their approaches to socialism. Thus, for example, a Muslim Socialist Committee (Müsülman Sosialist Komitesi), which formed in 1917 in Kazan and which Sultan-Galiev soon joined, espoused a great internal diversity of views. 37 What brought them together was the idea of a common revolutionary agency that was Muslim, Third
World and socialist/communist in nature. 'In order to prevent the oppression of the toiler of the East', averred Sultan-Galiev in 9 8, 'we must unite the Muslim masses in a communist movement that will be our own and autonomous'. 38 A few years later, however, even he began to understand that such a project would require a great deal of manoeuvring within an increasingly hostile Soviet state.
While the Bolsheviks continued to provide concessions for Muslims, including a short-lived return of sharī'a courts and administrative councils, 39 and made every effort to forge lasting ties with 'the peoples of the East', 40 The theories of the Muslim […] communists in the 9 0s were always tempered by hard realism.
[…] bove all, they understood that the Great-Russian imperial tradition was ongoing: that once a territory fell under Russian control it remained for all times a part of the imperium.
[…] Theory and practice served the same purpose -to neutralize Great-Russian imperialism at its source, or, if that failed, to defeat it by forming new alliances and new coalitions. 45 Sultan-Galiev's work in these troubled times followed two major directions a turn inwards, toward rethinking Muslim subjectivity and praxis, and a dedication to the sophisticated, if dangerous, jadīdist art of concealment (satr).
Double entendre with a tragic ending
Indicative of his intricate role in mediating between the Soviet and the Muslim spaces in his immediate political milieu are Sultan-Galiev's 9 articles in Zhizn' natsional'nostei on the supposed 'Methods of ntireligious Propaganda amongst the Muslims'. 46 Although he is quick to concede to some utility of such propaganda and, indeed, to declare himself atheist, Sultan-Galiev goes to great pains in these articles to explain to Muḥammad's ḥadīth on polygamy as effectively delimiting the then widespread polygamous practice. 47 Sultan-Galiev goes on to praise the Muslim 'clergy', exemplified in the positionalities of the Tatar mullā and the Uzbek 'ālim, who, unlike the Russian Orthodox clergy, generously perform numerous useful positions in the Muslim society, including that of 'priest', teacher, administrator, judge and even doctor, if need be. 48 The Muslim 'clergy', concludes Sultan-Galiev, consider themselves 'servants' of the people and listen to their constituents' voice, and are, therefore, by far more democratic and enjoy much greater respect and influence than their Russian Orthodox 'counterparts'. 49 The researchers who denounce Sultan-Galiev on the basis of these articles as a make love to us in order to betray us. It was better for the future of the colonial peoples to refrain from close mingling, as the English did. 53 Ebubekir replied 'The ideas of those times were different; moreover, had İsmail Bey said that, his [publications] would never have passed the censorship. In bad times he brought us at least some comfort!' 54 Gasprinski 's talent to evade censors even at the cost of some unseemly alliances has been described by one commentator as 'political quietism'. 55 That could be, indeed, another name for political satr, which the jadīds employed with great skill and success, 56 although at times to dismay of their more openly confrontational comrades.
Mir-Said Sultan-Galiev's satr was of an even more sophisticated type. There could be no doubt that he was aware at all times how dangerous a game this was, especially since 1923, the year in which he was arrested for the first time for conspiring-allegedly-to create 'an [anti-Soviet] organisation of the Validov type' and subsequently expelled from the party. 57 Sultan-Galiev's arrest was ordered after the infamous Soviet secret service, GPU (Gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie; State Political Administration), had intercepted his coded letter enjoining an Iranian communist, Tajī akhshī, 'to get in touch with fghani, Indian, rab and Turkish revolutionaries', supposedly for the purposes of creating the Colonial International. 58 The letter warned its reader 'Only in the unity of revolutionary Eastern countries lies the guarantee of success in the struggle for liberation. And only in that. Never forget this.' 59 It is nothing short of a miracle that Sultan-Galiev survived this episode and even managed to secure his release and regain, at least partly, Stalin's trust. Yet it is precisely his extraordinary talent in keeping up certain outward appearances while concealing from the Soviet regime his less palatable plans and activities that made the final phase of his gradual departure from the Bolshevik ideology almost within reach. If it were not for an additional set of letters intercepted by the ever-watchful GPU, some of which making clear requests to 'make a connection with Zeki Validov', 60 The peculiarity of Muslim Marxism as espoused by Sultan-Galiev was not only in its methodological idiosyncrasy, whereby the principles such as that of satr had been skilfully employed, in times of trouble, to assist the revolutionary cause. It was also in its early and in many ways avant-garde awareness of religious, cultural and racial connotations of class struggle in colonial and post-colonial contexts. In his unfinished 9 4 work titled 'Theses on the asis of Socio-Political, Economic and Cultural Development of the Turkic Peoples of sia and Europe', 63 Sultan-Galiev wrote of the need to reclaim historical materialism as an Eastern intellectual tradition, in a move resembling contemporary calls to end the hegemony of global Northern epistemologies in academia and beyond. 64 Muslim insurrectionary subjectivity, upon which SultanGaliev had placed all his hopes and dreams of global socialist freedom, had always been for him an intrinsically complex and multifaceted phenomenon, embodying at once a wide range of ethnic, national and religious practices of belonging, which in turn was conducive of specifically socialist, and indeed revolutionary, Muslim praxis. 
